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Abstract 
Many claim that Chinese people born after the one-child policy of 1979 are very 
individualistic or even selfish. This research tested the hypothesis that Chinese workers 
of the one-child-policy generation have difficulty working in a team, addressing the 
absence of nation-wide evidence. Using workers’ surveys, for the first time, across six 
major Chinese cities, the results denied the hypothesis, at least in the workplace.  
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Introduction 
Are Chinese workers from the “one-child-policy” generation individualistic or even 
selfish? Many scholars claim so. Detsch (2006) states that people in China today worry 
about creating a generation of “little emperors.” Crowell and Hsieh (1995) describe, 
“This generation of one-child policy will be the most self-centered in Chinese history 
and will turn traditional Chinese ethics and morality on their hands.” Chee (2000) 
explains the phenomena: the era of the only child coincides with a period of economic 
prosperity in China; so, Chinese families have unprecedented purchasing power, and 
their children may exert a bigger influence on family purchases than any children in the 
world do.  
 
On the other hand, foreign direct investors seem to be fond of hiring Chinese workers 
from the one-child-policy generation. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has been 
rapidly increasing over the last two decades (Figure 1). FDI has jumped radically, 
particularly since 1997, when the first wave of children from the one-child-policy 
generation reached the age of 18 and many entered the job market. As a result, China is 
now the world’s number-one producer of more than 100 consumer goods (Ying, 2005) 
and it is often described as the “factory of the world.” Of course, China’s trade 
deregulation policies and its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 
2001 partly explain its success. However, if the workers that belong to the 
one-child-policy generation are selfish, how has the FDI increased dramatically in the 
manufacturing field, which demands and values group work?  
 
Little research answers this question. No research compares workers’ individualism 
between those from the one-child-policy generation and others. Moreover, the research 
that describes the self-centeredness of the one-child-policy generation relies heavily on 
indirect evidence (e.g., the one-child-policy generation is more spoiled than other 
generations). This paper aims to address the absence of research to answer the 
above-mentioned question; the evidence is based on analyses of workers’ surveys in six 
major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Wuhan, and Shenyang.  
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in China 
 
Source: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (2010) 
 
Literature Review 
Many studies claim that the one-child-policy generation is selfish when compared to 
other generations, but such arguments rely heavily on indirect evidence. Crowell and 
Hsieh (199, p. 50), as mentioned earlier, described the one-child-policy generation as 
little emperors, because only children were reputed to use temper tantrums to get their 
parents to buy them what they wanted. Many studies endorsed a part of the argument. 
For instance, parenting in one-child families was more child-centered than in families 
with multiple children (Chow and Chen, 1994; Chow and Zhao, 1996). Only children 
received more toys and lucky money and were more likely to have a bank account 
(Chow and Zhao, 1996). However, some studies doubted the relationship between the 
concentrated attention of parents and the selfishness of children. According to Davis and 
Sensenbrener (2000), most parental purchases in China were directed toward their 
children’s educational needs, such as lessons and toys for good grades, and the 
purchases for children did not exceed those for adults. 
 
Moreover, empirical studies of the personalities of only children have produced mixed 
results. According to Shanghai Preschool Study Group (1980), the teachers in Shanghai 
preschools rated the personalities of only children more negatively than they rated those 
of children with siblings. However, the results from 115 studies analyzing the 
characteristics of only-children, published between 1925 and 1984, fail to support the 
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negative stereotypes of the only-child (Falbo, 1987). In fact, compared to offspring from 
other configurations, only-children in the study scored significantly higher on a variety 
of character outcomes, such as locus of control, autonomy, leadership, and maturity. 
Poston and Yu (1985), analyzing a survey of 1069 children in Changsha, endorsed the 
claim, suggesting that single children were more co-operative than those with siblings 
were. No research has investigated the characteristics of only-children with a 
nation-wide sample; this paper addresses the absence of research responding to the 
question. 
 
The workforce that foreign direct investors can employ in middle management and as 
workers is important to them (Wakayama, Shinntaku & Amano 2012). Management 
from the western countries often find it difficult to form groups of workers due to class 
bias, the philosophy of self-discipline, and attitudes of non-commitment and 
involvement avoidance (Hao & Fong, 2000). Successful management of operations 
depends largely on the employee’s collaborative attitude in a team. Through the study of 
sixty-two manufacturing Chinese-Western joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries 
in China, Björkman & Xiucheng (2002) showed clear co-relations between human 
resource management integration and high organizational performances. With that in 
mind, the possibly individualistic attitude of the workers who belong to the 
one-child-policy generation would significantly influence the business perspective for 
foreign direct investors. 
 
Method 
To investigate if the workers from the one-child-policy generation have difficulty 
working in a team, the study utilized data from Osaka University’s “Preference and 
Parameter Study” for 2011/2012. The study conducted face-to-face interviews with 
individuals and households in six major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Chengdu, Wuhan, and Shenyang, from December 23, 2011 to January 21, 2012. The 
target respondents were adults aged 20 to 70 years old. A Multistage Sampling and 
Allocation Method was used. First, the study set predicted numbers of responses based 
on the target population in each district using the Statistical Yearbook. Then, the study 
randomly selected an area in each district. Finally, using the Kish Grid method, the 
study chose the individuals from the families for interviews. From the data set, the 
current research chose 644 observations of employed respondents who had no missing 
answers.  
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The study began with a simple comparison of how much the respondents’ agreed with 
the following statement: “At work, I should follow the opinion of the group.” 
(Completely Disagree = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 = Completely Agree). Respondents’ low scores 
(e.g., close to 1) indicated that the respondents had difficulty working in a group and 
vice versa. The study first compared the average score between the workers that 
belonged to the one-child-policy generation (e.g., the workers born after the one-child 
policy of 1979) and the workers that belonged to another generation (e.g., the workers 
born prior to 1979). As indicated in Figure 1, contrary to the expectation, the workers 
born after 1979 scored slightly higher than those born prior to 1979 did.  
 
Additionally, the study compared scores internationally. The Preference Parameter 
Study for 2011/2011, used in this research, was an international survey that asked 
participants to respond to the same statement in Japan and the United States. Even 
compared to the other two nations, the Chinese workers born after 1979 scored the 
highest. 
 
Figure 2: Suitability for Group Work 
 
 
Nonetheless, one should not simply conclude that Chinese workers from the one-child 
policy are suitable for group work, for two reasons. First, the statement used to measure 
the suitability for group work was very subjective and often difficult to compare 
inter-culturally because the tendency of the answer varied, depending on the culture. 
That is, in one culture, people tended to score definite choices (e.g., 1 or 5 in this case), 
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whereas in another culture, people usually tried to avoid definite choices. Second, the 
study did not control for the basic attributes of respondents. Many factors, such as sex, 
educational background, and income may have affected a respondent’s suitability for 
group work. The study needed to control these variables in order to avoid possible 
sampling bias.     
 
Table 1 shows the variables. The dependent variable was how much the respondents 
valued group decisions (group). The independent variables were the dummy variable of 
the one-child policy (onepolicy) and the controlling variables, including gender (male), 
age (age), marriage status (spouse), educational background (educ), tenure (emphis), 
and company size (emp300). Researchers applied an ordered-probit estimation.  
 
Table 1: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
group Respond to the following statement: “At work, I should follow the 
opinion of the group.” (Completely Disagree=1, 2, 3,4,5=Completely 
Agree) 
male Male=1, Female=0 
age Age 
onepolicy born after the implementation of the one-child policy = 1, otherwise = 0 
spouse Married = 1, otherwise = 0 
educ Years of schooling 
msalary Monthly salary (Chinese Yen) 
emphis Years of employment (Median value of the questionnaire’s choices) 
emp300 Employer has 300 or more employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. The average number of years of 
employment among the observations is 9.67, with the average age being 37.61. The 
most observations are likely at the level of mid-manager. For that reason, the average 
monthly salary, 3609 CNY, is higher than the nation-wide average, about 2,000 CNY 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). An important aspect of this data is that 
more than half of the respondents were born after the implementation of China’s 
one-child policy of 1979. According to Crowell and Hsieh (1995: 50), the 
one-child-policy generation would be the most self-centered in Chinese history, as they 
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were pampered and raised as the only child in the family. How to cope with the workers 
from this generation becomes very important for foreign direct investors as the 
generation gradually occupies the majority of the labor force in China. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
group 3.86 0.81 1 5 644 
male 0.55 0.50 0 1 644 
age 37.61 11.27 19 68 644 
onepolicy 0.61 0.49 0 1 644 
spouse 0.78 0.42 0 1 644 
educ 11.84 2.83 0 16 644 
msalary 3609.3 2528.2 800 30000 644 
emphis 9.67 8.91 0.5 40 644 
emp300 0.22 0.41 0 1 644 
 
Table 3 illustrates the estimation results. Model 1 shows the results from all 
observations. Model 2 shows the results from the observations in secondary industry, 
whereas Model 3 indicates the results from the observations in tertiary industry. The 
results of the observations from primary industry are omitted, because of the shortage of 
the sample (N=19).  
 
Based on the results, the variable onepolicy did not significantly affect group. That is, 
Chinese workers from the one-child-policy generation were not necessarily selfish in 
groups. This also applied to Model 2 and Model 3. The hypothesis of “little emperors” 
was denied in the workplace. The factor that made Chinese workers suitable for group 
work was spouse for Model 1 and Model 3, and msalary for Model 2. The results might 
indicate that workers behave better when they need to be more responsible at home. On 
the other hand, there might be a causality issue with the msalary factor in Model 2. One 
does not know if the workers receive higher salaries because they behave well in the 
workplace or if they behave well because they receive higher salaries from the 
employer.   
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
 Model 1: All Model 2: Secondary Model 3: Tertiary 
 group group group 
group    
male -0.0481 0.108 -0.0869 
 (-0.54) (0.54) (-0.85) 
    
age 0.00566 0.00196 0.00742 
 (0.81) (0.15) (0.86) 
    
onepolicy -0.126 -0.0317 -0.156 
 (-0.83) (-0.09) (-0.90) 
    
spouse 0.265** -0.183 0.349*** 
 (2.23) (-0.66) (2.58) 
    
educ 0.00353 0.0198 -0.00251 
 (0.22) (0.52) (-0.13) 
    
msalary 0.0000288 0.000100** 0.00000659 
 (1.63) (2.50) (0.31) 
    
emphis 0.00204 0.00815 0.00385 
 (0.35) (0.80) (0.48) 
    
emp300 -0.120 -0.0684 -0.149 
 (-1.13) (-0.35) (-1.08) 
cut1    
_cons -2.303*** -0.957 -2.265*** 
 (-6.00) (-1.41) (-5.22) 
cut2    
_cons -1.136*** 0.0629 -1.179*** 
 (-3.58) (0.09) (-3.16) 
cut3    
_cons -0.142 1.590** -0.187 
 (-0.46) (2.36) (-0.51) 
cut4    
_cons 1.304***  1.222*** 
 (4.15)  (3.31) 
N 644 153 472 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Conclusion 
Many claim that Chinese people born after the one-child policy of 1979 are very 
individualistic or even selfish. This research tested the hypothesis that Chinese workers 
of the one-child-policy generation have difficulty working in a team, addressing the 
absence of nation-wide evidence. Using workers’ surveys, for the first time, across six 
major Chinese cities, the results denied the hypothesis, at least in the workplace.  
 
The research has limitations. First, this paper regarded Chinese workers solely as a 
“labor force.” Certainly, following group decisions is quite important for the workers at 
a factory, for example. However, that is not necessarily the case if the worker is an 
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entrepreneur or an independent sales person. As the data set did not include information 
about the respondents’ job titles, the study did not control that factor. Second, the data 
were collected only from urban areas (i.e., six major cities). The results might not be the 
same for rural areas.  
 
Nonetheless, this research is quite important. Although the success of foreign direct 
investment heavily relies on the quality of the local workers, the widespread stereotype 
of one-child-policy generation workers had not been examined in China, the most 
popular FDI destination in the world. This paper tested the hypothesis for the first time, 
using workers’ surveys across six major cities, and it concluded that the stereotype is 
not supported, at least in the workplace. Although this study has limitations, and the 
data were collected in six major cities only, the controversial nature of the 
one-child-policy generation and the lack of available empirical evidence from the 
workplace demand that researchers begin to construct a better understanding of this 
dispute. This paper contributes to that construction of knowledge and insight. 
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